How Freight Carriers Reacted to the Introduction of the Plato System

Abstract

This article examines the responses of different groups of freight carriers to the introduction of the 'Platon' road toll system in Russia. The study aims to explain why market participants adopted divergent behavioral strategies, ranging from compliance and adaptation to protest and evasion, despite a uniform regulatory framework. Drawing on structuration theory and the concept of everyday resistance, the theoretical framework interprets the introduction of the system as a state intervention into established routine practices and analyses the responses of actors in relation to their position in the industry, access to resources and capacity to circumvent control. The study is based on 80 in-depth interviews with carriers and drivers, as well as materials collected through participant observation during fieldwork. This design enables both formal and informal adaptation practices to be captured. The analysis identifies three key types of market participant: large transport companies, independent carriers ('owner-­operators'), and industrial enterprises. It demonstrates how differences in their economic models and institutional embeddedness shape their strategic responses. Findings show that large companies and industrial enterprises tend to adapt by incorporating additional costs into their business models, whereas independent carriers develop evasion strategies that rely on informal practices and the limited enforcement capacity of the state. Although protests initially reached a considerable scale, they did not become a dominant or sustainable form of response, resulting only in partial concessions. Over time, many actors shifted towards everyday forms of resistance, which proved more durable. The study shows that the effectiveness of such regulatory systems depends on more than just their technical design; institutional arrangements, market structure and enforcement capacity are also important factors. The Russian case shows that, where 'free spaces' and informal adaptation practices persist, formal regulation can result in partial compliance and the transformation of actors’ behavior rather than its full alignment with policy goals.